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24 
Dignity and Justice for All 
ARTHUR CHASKALSON* 
 
―Dignity and Justice for All‖ is the theme of the year-long 
celebrations of the 60
th
 anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.  Celebrating the Universal Declaration is also the 
theme of this conference, and the title matches that theme.  In the 
context of that theme I have been invited to talk about human rights 
in South Africa, which will be the focus of my remarks.  The 
Preamble to the Universal Declaration records that: 
disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in 
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of man-
kind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall 
enjoy freedom of speech and belief, and freedom from fear and 
want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the 
common people.  
It goes on to say that ―it is essential, if man is not to be compelled 
to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and 
oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.‖  
This is a reference to the horror of the Second World War, to the 
inhumanity of the Nazi regime and the repression it imposed within 
Germany and the territories it occupied, and to the optimism in the 
wake of that war, that there would be a better world.  The vision of 
the better world contemplated by the Universal Declaration is one in 
which there would be social justice and respect for the inherent 
dignity of all people: a world in which fundamental rights and 
freedoms will be upheld by all nations.  The same words would 
appropriately describe the atmosphere in South Africa in 1994 when 
 
* Chief Justice of South Africa (retired), and Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, 
University of Maryland School of Law. 
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a democratic constitutional state was established.  
On May 10, 1994, President Nelson Mandela was sworn in as 
South Africa’s first democratic President.  Speaking to the nation, he 
captured the spirit of the Universal Declaration’s preamble, saying: 
We enter into a covenant that we shall build the society in 
which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to 
walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their 
inalienable right to human dignity—a rainbow nation at peace 
with itself and the world. 
  . . . . 
  Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful 
land will again experience the oppression of one by 
another . . . .1 
Sixty years after the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, we can see how difficult it has been to realize the 
aspirations expressed in the Declaration, to secure the universal and 
effective recognition and observance of its provisions, by all U.N. 
member states.  That is an issue that will be addressed later during 
this conference.  
The Universal Declaration contemplates that everyone should 
enjoy not only fundamental civil and political rights, but also 
―economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his [or her] 
dignity and the free development of his [or her] personality.‖2  Our 
Constitution has similar provisions to which I will refer later.  
Fourteen years after the establishment of a democratic constitutional 
state in the place of the egregious apartheid state, although substantial 
progress has been made towards establishing a legal order based on 
the rule of law and respect for human rights, we in South Africa can 
also see how difficult it is to achieve the social justice our Consti-
tution contemplates. 
To understand the difficulties that confront us in South Africa, it is 
necessary to go back to our history.  As a result of history, black 
South Africans, the great majority of the population of South Africa, 
were for all practical purposes denied the franchise in the land of 
 
1. Nelson Mandela, President of South Africa, Inaugural Address (May 10, 1994), 
available at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1994/inaugpta.html. 
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 22, U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].  See also id. arts. 23–27 (articulating social, 
economic, and cultural rights).  
3 CHASKALSON SPEECH (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/2009  11:34 AM 
26 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 24:24 
their birth.  This was a privilege reserved for whites.  In 1948, the 
year in which the Universal Declaration was adopted, the white 
voters of South Africa elected the National Party as their government.  
The campaign slogan of the Nationalists had been ―apartheid,‖ which 
literally meant separateness, but really meant white domination and 
the subjugation of the black population.   
Apartheid was the culmination of a process of white supremacy 
which had been in place for three centuries.  Throughout this period, 
whites, who were a small minority of the population, used their 
political and economic power to further their own interests, partly 
through the manner in which they organized the society and allocated 
its resources, and partly by the enactment of racially discriminatory 
legislation.  Under apartheid this process was deeply entrenched.  
Apartheid became a powerful ideology, based on the false assump-
tion that blacks were an inferior race.  Apartheid was institutionalized 
in the legal system and affected all aspects of life in South Africa.  
Supremacy of Parliament 
At that time, the doctrine of supremacy of parliament, a principle 
of English law, later entrenched in the Republic of South Africa 
Constitution of 1961, was applied by our courts.  Its impact best can 
be described by referring to a passage from a judgment of the 
Appellate Division, where the then-Chief Justice said, ―Parliament 
may make any encroachment it chooses upon the life, liberty, or 
property of any individual subject to its sway . . . and it is the 
function of the courts of law to enforce its will.‖3  This was done as a 
matter of course under apartheid.  Legislation could not be invali-
dated and, where it was interpreted in a manner which did not meet 
the satisfaction of the government, the ―loophole‖ could be closed by 
legislation.  Law enforcement provided the means by which discrim-
ination was kept in place and dissent was curtailed.  This was done 
through a draconian system of security legislation similar in many 
respects to anti-terrorism measures we see in different parts of the 
world today, which will be the subject of discussion in a later session 
of this conference.  Thus, the practice of parliamentary supremacy 
 
3. Sachs v Minister of Justice 1934 A.D. 11 (A) at 37 (S. Afr.) (Stratford, C.J.), cited in 
CORA HOEXTER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 12 (2007), and Kate O’Regan, 
Breaking Ground: Some Thoughts on the Seismic Shift in our Administrative Law, 121 SALJ 
424 (2004). 
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drew judicial officers into the process of enforcing apartheid, a 
legacy that still hangs over the courts.   
The Universal Declaration warns that tyranny and oppression lead 
ultimately to rebellion.  This is what happened in South Africa.  
Despite the massive power of the state, there was an ongoing and 
intense struggle against apartheid fuelled largely by the frustrations 
of its victims.  Many died or were imprisoned during the course of 
that struggle.  Ultimately, the conflict was brought to an end by a 
negotiated settlement. 
The Constitutional Settlement 
The settlement was recorded as ―a solemn pact‖ in an interim 
Constitution which came into force in April 1994.  It contained an 
entrenched Bill of Rights, and a resolution on national unity and 
reconciliation which formed part of the Constitution.  The resolution 
begins with a statement that:  
  This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the 
past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, 
conflict, untold suffering and injustice and a future founded on 
the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful 
coexistence and development of opportunities for all South 
Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.4 
The resolution goes on to stress the imperatives of unity and 
reconciliation and the need to lay a firm foundation for the future in 
order to transcend the divisions and strife of the past.   
The interim Constitution made provision for the transition to 
democracy to be completed in two stages.  While there is no time to 
discuss that process tonight, it is sufficient to say that it led to a new 
democratic Constitution which came into force in February 1997.   
The Founding Values 
In the preamble to the Constitution, the injustice of the past is 
acknowledged, and a commitment is made to improve the quality of 
life of all citizens and to free the potential of each person.  The 
founding values of the new legal order are identified specifically in 
 
4. S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993, epilogue (National Unity and Reconciliation).  The 
resolution is incorporated into and forms part of the present Constitution which was 
proclaimed on December 18, 1996 and came into force on February 4, 1997.   
3 CHASKALSON SPEECH (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/2009  11:34 AM 
28 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 24:24 
the Constitution.5  They are: human dignity; the achievement of 
equality; the advancement of human rights and freedoms,6 including 
non-sexism and non-racism;7 and respect for certain of the funda-
mental principles of democracy—the rule of law, universal adult 
suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections, and a 
multi-party system of democratic government to ensure account-
ability, responsiveness, and openness.8  
The Impact of the Constitution 
The Constitution does not simply remove apartheid laws and 
sanitize the old legal order.  It does much more than that.  It demands 
that our society be transformed from the closed, repressive, racial 
oligarchy of the past, to an open society based on social justice and 
these founding values—values which must now inform all aspects of 
our legal order.  These changes were, in truth, revolutionary. 
The Circumstances Existing when the Constitution Was Adopted  
At that time we were, and indeed still are, one of the most unequal 
societies in the world.  The past hung over us, profoundly affecting 
the environment in which we were living.  The great majority of 
South Africans had been the victims of a system of racial discrim-
ination and repression that had affected them deeply in almost all 
aspects of their lives.  This was seen most obviously in the disparities 
of wealth and skills between those who had benefited from colonial 
rule and apartheid, and those who had not.  It was seen in the contrast 
between those with land, and the millions of landless people; between 
those with homes, and the millions without adequate housing; 
between those living in comfort, and the millions without access to 
adequate health facilities, clean water, or electricity; between those 
with skills and secure occupations, and the millions who, as a result 
of inferior education, lacked skills required for the professions or 
managerial positions in commerce and industry, and were either 
unemployed or had limited employment opportunities.  The conflict 
left in its wake a severely damaged economy, a fragmented and 
traumatized society, widespread poverty and underdevelopment, and 
 
5. These are entrenched in Chapter 1 of the Constitution.  S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 1. 
6. Id. s. 1(a). 
7. Id. s. 1(b). 
8. Id. s. 1(d). 
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corruption.  It was in this environment that we adopted the new 
constitutional order.  
The Bill of Rights 
The founding values are given substance in a bill of rights, which 
is declared in the Constitution to be ―a cornerstone of democracy in 
South Africa.‖9  It not only entrenches internationally recognized 
civil and political rights and freedoms, but, consistent with the 
Universal Declaration, also makes provision for socio-economic 
rights.  
The Courts 
When the new constitutional order was introduced, the existing 
courts, which had enforced apartheid, were retained, and the existing 
judges and magistrates remained in office.  One new court, the 
Constitutional Court, was established.  It was to be the highest court 
in respect of all constitutional matters and its decisions on such 
matters would be binding on all other courts.  In my comments I will 
focus on the role of this Court in developing the new constitutional 
jurisprudence of our country, paying particular attention to concerns 
of dignity and equality. 
The New Constitutional Order 
In contrast with the position of courts under apartheid, our courts 
now have extensive powers.  The exercise of public power, and in 
many instances, private power, is subject to constitutional control.10  
Courts are required to declare any law or conduct inconsistent with 
the Constitution to be invalid to the extent of such inconsistency,11 
and the Constitution states explicitly that ―an order or decision issued 
by a court binds all persons to whom and all organs of state to which 
it applies.‖12  
All lawmaking authority must be exercised in accordance with the 
 
9. Id. s. 7(1). 
10. Pharm. Mfr. Ass’n of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) paras. 40–45 (S. Afr.). 
11. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 7(1) (―The Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in 
South Africa.  It enshrines  the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic 
values of human dignity, equality and freedom.‖). 
12. Id. s. 165(5). 
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Constitution, and there is no aspect of law and government that is not 
affected by it.13  This means, as the Constitutional Court has held, that 
―the legislature and executive in every sphere [of government] are 
constrained by the principle that they may exercise no power and 
perform no function beyond that conferred upon them by law.‖14  All 
law, including the common law, must be developed and legislation 
must be interpreted to promote the spirit of the bill of rights,15 the 
core values of which are declared to be human dignity, equality, and 
freedom.  As the Constitutional Court has said, ―[n]o-one could miss 
the significance of the hermeneutic standard set.  The values urged 
upon the Court are not those that have informed our past.  Our history 
is one of repression not freedom, oligarchy not democracy, apartheid 
and prejudice not equality, clandestine not open government.‖16 
How the Courts Have Applied the Constitution  
When the Constitution was adopted, effect could be given to its 
founding values only if fundamental changes were made to the 
political, social, and economic conditions that previously existed in 
our country.  This has been emphasised by the Constitutional Court 
on more than one occasion.  It has emphasised that ―a commitment 
to . . . transform our society into one in which there will be human 
dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of the new 
constitutional order.‖17  This commitment to transformation is key to 
understanding our Constitution and its interpretation.  The Consti-
tution provides the framework within which the transformation is to 
be carried out.  The Preamble, the founding values, and the Bill of 
Rights that gives effect to them, articulate the goals to be achieved.  
As the Constitutional Court has said, ―the process of interpreting the 
Constitution must recognise the context in which we find ourselves 
and the Constitution’s goal of a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental human rights.  This spirit of transition 
and transformation characterizes the constitutional enterprise as a 
 
13. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n, (2) SA 674 para. 44. 
14. Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd. v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metro. Council, 
1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) para. 58 (S. Afr.). 
15. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 39(2). 
16. State v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para. 322 (S. Afr.). 
17. Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) para. 8 (S. 
Afr.). 
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whole.‖18   
Socio-Economic Rights 
The Universal Declaration recalls that ―[t]he United Nations have 
in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of 
men and women and have determined to promote social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom.‖19  There is no dignity in 
being compelled to live in conditions of abject poverty without access 
to basic necessities of life such as food, water, health services, and 
housing.  Under our Constitution the government is obliged to 
address such needs.  The Constitution provides that everyone has the 
right to have access to housing, health care, food, water, and social 
security.20  It requires the state to take reasonable legislative and other 
measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive 
realisation of these rights.21  It also deals with land reform22 and 
access to education.23  
The socio-economic rights give effect to the constitutional value of 
human dignity, and this influences the approach of the Court to 
claims for the enforcement of such rights.  Dealing with a claim for 
access to housing, the Constitutional Court held that: 
  Reasonableness must . . . be understood in the context of 
the Bill of Rights as a whole.  The right of access to adequate 
housing is entrenched because we value human beings and 
want to ensure that they are afforded their basic needs.  A 
society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are 
provided to all if it is to be a society based on human dignity, 
freedom and equality.24   
The State is required by the Constitution to ―respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil‖ rights contained in the Bill of Rights.25  The 
justiciability of socio-economic rights is therefore not an issue in 
 
18. Investigating Directorate: Serious Econ. Offences v Hyundai Motor Distrib. 2001 (1) 
SA 545 (CC) para. 21 (S. Afr.). 
19. UDHR, supra note 2, pmbl. 
20. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ss. 26–27.   
21. Id. ss. 26(2), 27(2). 
22. Id. s. 25(5). 
23. Id. s. 29(1). 
24. South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para. 44 (S. Afr.). 
25. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 7(2). 
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South Africa.  The question, as the Court has said, is thus ―not 
whether socio-economic rights are justiciable under our Constitution, 
but how to enforce them in a given case.  This is a very difficult issue 
which must be carefully explored on a case by case basis.‖26  In 
addressing this issue, arguments about institutional competence and 
the role of courts in a democracy come to the fore, not in the context 
of justiciability, but in the context of how courts should deal with 
claims that positive action be taken by the state to fulfill its 
constitutional obligations.   
Such claims are at the border of the separation of powers between 
the judiciary and the executive.  A balance must be struck between 
the role of the court as interpreter and upholder of the Constitution, 
and the role of government in a democratic society as policymaker 
and lawmaker.  That is not easily done.  Inevitably, claims for the 
enforcement of socio-economic rights are hard cases.  They are hard, 
not only because they draw courts into policy matters, including 
possibly the budget itself, but because of the abject living conditions 
of many people in our country and their legitimate demands that this 
be addressed now that apartheid is over.   
Positive claims for socio-economic rights are therefore approached 
carefully, on a case by case basis, bearing in mind that, as the 
Constitutional Court has said: 
courts are not institutionally equipped to make the wide-
ranging factual and political enquiries necessary for . . . 
deciding how public revenues should most effectively be 
spent. . . . [and] are ill suited to adjudicate upon issues where 
court orders could have multiple social and economic conse-
quences for the community.  The Constitution contemplates 
rather a restrained and focused role for the courts, namely, to 
require the state to take measures to meet its constitutional 
obligations and to subject the reasonableness of these measures 
to evaluation.  Such determinations of reasonableness may in 
fact have budgetary implications, but are not in themselves 
directed to rearranging budgets. In this way the judicial, 
legislative and executive functions achieve appropriate 
constitutional balance.27  
 
26. Grootboom, (1) SA 46 para. 44. 
27. Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) paras. 37–38 
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On the other hand, the Court has insisted that such rights are 
justiciable and subject to evaluation to determine whether or not 
government action (or inaction) is consistent with the standards 
prescribed by the Constitution.  In doing so it has rejected arguments 
by the government that the making of policy is its prerogative, and 
that courts cannot make orders that would have the effect of requiring 
government not to pursue a particular policy, saying:  
Where state policy is challenged as inconsistent with the 
Constitution, courts have to consider whether in formulating 
and implementing such policy the state has given effect to its 
constitutional obligations.  If it should hold in any given case 
that the state has failed to do so, it is obliged by the Consti-
tution to say so.  In so far as that constitutes an intrusion into 
the domain of the executive, that is an intrusion mandated by 
the Constitution itself.28 
The state has to manage its limited resources in order to address 
the extensive needs of millions of people for access to a multiplicity 
of social goods such as health, housing, food and water, employment 
opportunities, social security, and the other socio-economic rights 
entrenched in the Constitution.  What the state does in one sphere 
may affect its ability to deal with needs in other spheres.  There will 
thus be times ―when this requires [the state] to adopt an holistic 
approach to the larger needs of society rather than to focus on the 
specific needs of particular individuals.‖29  Where the lack of human 
or financial resources is put in issue by the state, more than a ―bald 
assertion‖ of resource constraints will be required. 
Details of the precise character of the resource constraints, 
whether human or financial, in the context of the overall 
resourcing of the organ of state will need to be provided.  The 
standard of reasonableness so understood conforms to the 
constitutional principle of accountability, on the one hand, in 
that it requires decision-makers to disclose their reasons for 
their conduct, and the principle of effectiveness on the other, 
for it does not unduly hamper the decision-maker’s authority 
 
(S. Afr.); see also Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd. t/a Metrorail 2005 (2) SA 
359 (CC) para. 86 (S. Afr.). 
28. Treatment Action Campaign, (5) SA 721 para. 99. 
29. Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) para. 31 
(S. Afr.). 
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to determine what are reasonable and appropriate measures in 
the overall context of their activities.30   
The Court has established a framework for dealing with such 
claims built around three principles.  
First, socio-economic rights are justiciable and if claims are 
brought before the courts, then it is their duty to consider whether or 
not the State has complied with its obligations under the Constitution.  
In subjecting the measures taken by the State to constitutional review, 
all aspects of the state’s performance, including policy, if that be 
relevant to the decision, must be taken into account.   
Second, the standard of review to be applied is whether, in the 
light of the provisions of the Constitution and the State’s available 
resources, the measures taken by the State can be said to be 
reasonable.  Policies and programs must be reasonable ―both in their 
conception and their implementation.‖31  Reasonableness is a legal 
principle which our courts are required to apply when there is a 
challenge to the validity of administrative action of the executive.  
Although the context is different, similar techniques to those applied 
in administrative law have been adopted to give effect to the 
constitutional requirement that measures taken must be reasonable.  
Reasonableness in this context requires an appropriate balance to be 
struck ―between the need to ensure that constitutional obligations are 
met, on the one hand, and recognition for the fact that the bearers of 
those obligations should be given appropriate leeway to determine 
the best way to meet the obligations in all the circumstances.‖32  It 
will therefore not  
enquire whether other more desirable or favourable measures 
could have been adopted, or whether public money could have 
been better spent . . . . [A] wide range of possible measures 
could be adopted by the state to meet its obligations.  Many of 
these would meet the requirement of reasonableness.  Once it 
is shown that the measures do so, this requirement is met.33 
And finally, courts must deal with such matters in a restrained and 
focused manner, with due regard to their limited institutional 
 
30. Metrorail, (2) SA 359 para. 88.  For an example of a case where this was done, see 
Soobramoney, (1) SA 765. 
31. Grootboom, (1) SA 46 para. 42. 
32. Metrorail, (2) SA 359 para. 87. 
33. Grootboom, (1) SA 46 para. 41. 
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capacity, and the multiple social and economic consequences which 
may result from the Court’s order.  I should add that these conse-
quences would, of course, include not only those flowing from a 
decision to uphold a claim, but also from a decision not to do so. 
There is no time to examine the specific facts of particular cases in 
any detail.  In applying these principles, the Constitutional Court has 
held that a national protocol setting priorities for the use of dialysis 
machines in public hospitals was reasonable;34 but it has held to be 
unreasonable the housing policy of a municipality which failed to 
make adequate provision for access to housing by homeless people,35 
the policy of the national government in failing to permit doctors in 
public hospitals and clinics to prescribe an inexpensive antiretroviral 
drug to combat the mother-to-child transmission of the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus,36 and social welfare legislation which 
excluded permanent residents from its provisions.37  Its decisions in 
these cases have had far-reaching implications in eviction cases, 
particularly where the applicant is an organ of the state, in bringing 
about changes to the state’s policy to address the scourge of AIDS, 
and in cases involving other positive obligations imposed on the state 
by the Constitution or legislation.38  
What the South African experience shows is that it is possible, as 
Professor Sunstein has noted, to assess claims of constitutional 
violations of socio-economic rights without requiring at the same 
time more than existing resources will allow.39  He suggests that the 
approach adopted by the South African courts ―[e]nsures respect for 
sensible priority setting, and close attention to particular needs, 
without displacing democratic judgments about how to set prior-
ities.‖40  In so doing, the South African model provides an answer to 
those who contend that socio-economic rights are not justiciable.  It 
also enables ―[t]hose whose needs are the most urgent and whose 
ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril‖41 to turn to the 
 
34. Soobramoney, (1) SA 765. 
35. Grootboom, (1) SA 46. 
36. Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
37. Khosa v Minister of Soc. Dev. 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (S.Afr.). 
38. See, e.g., Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd. t/a Metrorail 2005 (2) SA 
359 (CC) (S. Afr.); Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) 
(S. Afr.); Jaftha v Schoeman 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
39. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 236 (2001). 
40. Id. at 227–29. 
41. South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para. 44 (S. Afr.). 
3 CHASKALSON SPEECH (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/2009  11:34 AM 
36 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 24:24 
courts if their needs are neglected.  That is an important safeguard 
and one that deserves constitutional protection.   
Equality 
There are many different forms of inequality that influence the 
lives of people: inequality of income; inequality of capacity due to 
lack of access to land, housing, education, health care, or other 
necessities of life; inequality due to social exclusion because of 
stereotypical attitudes or prejudices; and inequality because of 
benefits accorded to others on account of patronage, favoritism, or 
corruption.  There is no end to the possible examples.  
The Constitution provides in conventional terms that ―everyone is 
equal before the law and entitled to the equal benefit and protection 
of the law.‖42  Linked to the equal protection clause is a clause 
prohibiting discrimination.  Given the history of inequality in South 
Africa, a formal application of equality and anti-discrimination 
clauses might have entrenched existing patterns of privilege and 
hampered the achievement of the constitutional goal of transfor-
mation.  This was a particular risk in a country like ours with its long 
history of institutionalized discrimination. 
The drafters of our Constitution knew about the evolving 
principles of equality law in other countries.  They were acutely 
aware of the disputes in the United States over the interpretation and 
application of the 14
th
 Amendment and, in particular, of the litigation 
here concerning affirmative action.  To avoid such disputes in South 
Africa, and to ensure that equality is given a substantive and not 
merely a formal meaning, the Constitution also provides: ―[e]quality 
includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.  To 
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures 
designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.‖43   
Consistent with this, the anti-discrimination clause targets ―unfair 
discrimination,‖ providing that: ―[t]he state may not unfairly discrim-
inate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age disability, religion, conscience, 
 
42. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 9(1). 
43. Id. s. 9(2). 
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belief culture, language and birth.‖44  The prohibition against unfair 
discrimination is then extended to all persons and it is provided that 
national legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination.45  This ensures that the prohibition of unfair discrim-
ination extends to the exercise of private power as well as public 
power.  Such legislation has been enacted. 
The Constitutional Court construes the equality clauses as calling 
for a substantive rather than a formal approach to equality, saying 
that the Constitution ―[h]eralds not only equal protection of the law 
and non-discrimination but also the start of a credible and abiding 
process of reparation for past exclusion, dispossession and indignity 
within the discipline of our constitutional framework.‖46  And further, 
that ―decades of systematic racial discrimination entrenched by the 
apartheid legal order cannot be eliminated without positive action 
being taken to achieve that result.‖47 
It follows that some of the debates that have taken place around 
affirmative action in the context of equal protection clauses in the 
United States of America may not arise in South Africa and the 
decisions of our Courts on equality issues may well differ from 
decisions of the United States courts on similar issues.  In a modern 
society it is impossible for government to perform its regulatory role 
without making regulations that differentiate between people.   
Discrimination, therefore, means something more than mere 
differentiation.  In common parlance it has a pejorative content 
implying that the person or persons concerned have been prejudiced 
by unfavorable treatment.  The constitutional standard of unfair 
discrimination requires also that a judgment be made concerning the 
fairness or unfairness of the particular differentiation.  In an early 
judgment on the issue of discrimination, the Constitutional Court 
said: 
Given the history of this country, we are of the view that 
―discrimination‖ has acquired a particular pejorative meaning 
relating to the unequal treatment of people based on attributes 
and characteristics attaching to them.  We are emerging from a 
 
44. Id. s. 9(3). 
45. Id. s. 9(4). 
46. Minister of Finance v van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) para. 25 (S. Afr.). 
47. Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Envtl. Affairs & Tourism 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para. 
74 (S. Afr.). 
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period of our history during which the humanity of the 
majority of the inhabitants of this country was denied.  They 
were treated as not having inherent worth; as objects whose 
identities could be arbitrarily defined by those in power rather 
than as persons of infinite worth.  In short, they were denied 
recognition of their inherent dignity.48  
The phrase ―unfair discrimination‖ should therefore be understood, 
said the Court, as denoting differential treatment which impairs the 
fundamental dignity of the persons affected or impacts on them in a 
comparably serious manner.49  
The fundamental dignity referred to is not a narrow criterion; it is a 
dignity that respects a community in which all are equal members 
entitled to equal concern and respect.  The impact of the discrim-
ination on the complainant is what is crucial.  It is not enough for a 
complainant to show that he or she was subjected to unequal 
treatment unless it resulted in prejudice of such a nature.   
This calls for a nuanced and comprehensive enquiry in which all 
relevant factors must be assessed ―cumulatively and objectively.‖50  
Factors relevant to the inquiry into unfairness include a consideration 
of the extent to which the discrimination has affected the rights or 
interests of complainants; the more invasive the discrimination to the 
interests of those affected by it, the more likely it will be held to be 
unfair.  The position of the complainants in society and whether they 
suffered in the past from patterns of disadvantage are relevant.  The 
more vulnerable the group, the more likely it is that discrimination 
will be unfair.51  The nature of the provision and the aims it seeks to 
achieve are also relevant; legislation or conduct is less likely to be 
held unfair if its purpose is directed to achieving equality.52  
It is not possible here to catalogue the decisions of our courts to 
show how they are approaching their task of translating human rights 
into practice.  I have said enough to show how they have given effect 
to issues of dignity and equality, the core values of the Universal 
 
48. Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) para. 31 (S. Afr.).  
49. Id. para. 33. 
50. National Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 
(CC) para. 41 (S. Afr.). 
51. See City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) para. 44 (S. Afr.); 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) para. 112 (S. Afr.). 
52. See National Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal., (2) SA 1 para. 41. 
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Declaration. 
What our courts are doing must be seen in light of the cir-
cumstances of our country, of our constitution, and of our history.  
Though institutional racial discrimination no longer exists, and much 
has changed for the better, there is still widespread poverty, 
landlessness and unemployment, and great disparities between rich 
and poor.  I believe in our country and its future; but, it must be 
acknowledged that despite the commitments made in our Consti-
tution, we have a long way to go to realize the aspirations of the 
Universal Declaration. 
